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A recent article by Lisa Sowle Cahill ("A Natural Law Reconsideration of Euthanasia," Linacre Quarterly, February, 1977) was preceded
by a brief statement in which the author and publisher invited comment on her consideration of this important topic . The following
reflections are a brief response to that article. They are made with
similar tentativeness, as this author also recognizes that the issue is far
from settled.
Having carefully read Ms. Cahill's article, I find myself agreeing
with her conclusion, viz., that there are circumstances where direct
euthanasia could be a moral option, while at the same time, I feel that
her presentation failed to come to grips with the most important
specific concerns in this area, as well as stretching a principle to the
point where it ceases to have much meaning. In the latter instance, I
am referring to the principle of totality. In Pius XII 's utilization of
this principle, it is most certainly true that he was interested in both
the physical and spiritual good of the whole person. Hence individual
organs could be subordinated to the spiritual end of the person (p.
49). However, what was most central in the application of this principle was not subordination to specific ends as such, but rather subordination of the part to the whole.
In the euthanasia instance, one is not really talking about subordination of a part, but rather the destruction of the whole. One is not
simply sacrificing a physical organism but the whole person. While
biological life is not an absolute value , its total absence (as in the case
of euthanasia) means, in fact, the cessation of the person . Persons are
embodied beings. A failure to recognize this leads to a type of Cartesian dualism that one would hope is gone forever . Ms. Cahill writes,
"The intention of the principle of totality is to respect and safeguard
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the integrity and welfare of the whole human being." (p. 49). I would
hasten to add that what was also intended by the principle of totality
was that its application be in situations which were life-saving. Other
situations where there was the possibility or actuality of death were
covered more properly by the principle of double effect. To speak
about sacrificing the total bodily existence for the sake of the whole
person makes little sense in terms of contemporary theological or
philosophical an thropology.
Instead of taking the route of trying to discuss this issue under the
aspects of the principle of totality, one is certainly better off centering
the debate on the principle of double effect, which has had a meaningful application in this regard, and is currently undergoing some reexamination. In Ms. Cahill's discussion of this principle, I would agree
that the innocence or guilt of the aggressor is not the most appropriate
context for discussing this principle (pp. 54-56). The crucial question
was not the innocence or guilt, but rather the fact of the material
aggression itself, viz., the threat to life. Furthermore, the most important element of this principle was the fourth condition, i.e., proportionate reason. And a crucial element of that condition was the question of short or long range consequences of such actions. Ms. Cahill
cites Richard McCormick's objection to euthanasia (footnote 41) and
asserts that" . .. the telling point in arguments for and against euthanasia is whether one believes that the future danger is so probable and
so serious that it outweighs harm done or permitted in the present
instance, or whether it in fact represents the lesser evil. Such an estimation is more a product of moral insight into human nature and
moral responsibility than of rational deduction with probative
force .... "
I would agree that the formal structure of the debate will center on
the balancing of potential good for the patient and possible harm to
others. However, while Ms. Cahill recognizes this when she writes,
"There may exist a positive duty to support his desire to die, if no
conflict exists with other overriding rights and duties ," (p. 56) she
does not spell out what those rights and duties might be. And this is at
the center of all discussions on euthanasia. In other words, while
centering on the crux of the problem in a formal way, she is not very
helpful in fleshing out the material content of such rights and duties.
What rights and duties are most crucial to the personal and social
dimensions of euthanasia decisions? One must get down to specifics,
or be lost in abstractions. It is the specific issue of balancing particular
rights and duties that has become the focus of the debate today. This
is borne out by looking at contemporary constitutional law discussions on the issue. The question here is not whether one might positively support a person's desire to die, but rather on the specific
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reasons why the law has traditionally prohibited direct euthanasia.
Some of these reasons are certainly paternalistic (protecting the person against a possible wrong decision), but the strongest arguments are
those which look to the possible consequences for those either immediately or remotely related to euthanasia decisions. One finds arguments against the introduction of the principle of direct euthanasia
into law, as well as arguments directed against specific problems in its
implementation. In the former category, one needs to assess issues
such as whether there is still a need for euthanasia due to advances in
pain-killing drugs, the effects upon patient-physician relationship, etc.
In the latter category, one ought to consider if and how abuses can
be prevented, e.g., extending euthanasia from voluntary situations to
involuntary ones, etc . It is only by addressing these specific issues that
one can really get handles on the significance of the euthanasia question. And while, "such an estimation is more a product of moral
insight than of rational deduction with probative force," one does
need to assess moral insight and moral responsibility by considering
the actual experience of "human nature" by seriously considering the
history of moral experience in this regard. One good starting point for
looking at this experience is through actual cases as they have been
handled in civil law. This is not the only starting point. But at least
one remains empirically grounded, and is able to get to the specifics,
approaching the issue with concrete realism.
In summary, I would agree with Ms. Cahill that one can construct a
good case for the approval of direct euthanasia in exceptional cases. I
would also contend that most, if not all of the major consequentialist
objections to this practice can be sufficiently answered so as to warrant its possibility. But it is these concrete objections that one must
consider if the discussion is to be moved forward. While Ms. Cahill has
been helpful in summarizing the developments in a formal way, she
has not been very helpful in fleshing out that skeletal framework with
concrete realism grounded in the actual practice of those most closely
involved in euthanasia decisions.
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